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1. Introduction
The most basic principle in sovereign debt restructuring is the principle
that there should be parity of treatment between equivalent creditors in
respect of comparable debt to be restructured. I would like in this paper
to focus on this basic principle and show the ways in which the principle
is applied in different situations.
Two preliminary comments are called for. Firstly, it has often been said
that the modern sovereign debt crisis started in earnest with Poland in
1981 (although there had been immediate precursors like Turkey) and that
there was a first phase to the crisis lasting from 1981 until 1984. This first
phase was characterized by the rapid development of techniques to deal
with medium-term restructurings, raising what is best described as in-
voluntary new money and the rearrangement of short-term debt. In 1984,
a second phase started to emerge with the concept of multiyear restruc-
turings and the further sophistication of the earlier techniques particularly
in relation to alignment of restructurings with a continuing role of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The principle with which we are
concerned was basic to both the first and second phases of the modern
sovereign debt crisis.
Secondly, it is possible to adduce general norms that have been applied
throughout the different restructurings carried out for the different coun-
tries. But it must be borne in mind that there are no absolute rules handed
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down which have to be applied to every restructuring nor is there any
form of code or convention regulating the requirements country by coun-
try of the restructuring process. The form of the restructuring for each
country is worked out on a pragmatic ad hoc basis, albeit using various
general principles which have been applied to different restructurings.
Every country arrangement is individual.
!!. Principle of Parity of Treatment
It had become axiomatic in the 1970s to assert that sovereign states
cannot go bankrupt. The 1980s have proved this axiom up to a point.
Clearly there are no formal insolvency or liquidation rules that apply to
sovereign states. There is no method by which the assets of a sovereign
state can be distributed among the creditors. Creditors have not scrambled
to obtain security for their debts as they usually do in domestic work
outs. Instead the creditors have resorted to long, patient negotiations to
put their debts on a more orderly footing, essentially a footing on which
interest payments will be maintained.
It is on this account that the principle of parity of treatment is so basic.
Sovereign debt restructuring is only successful if it is the product of a
successful negotiation with the sovereign debtor and if all relevant cred-
itors subscribe to it. It will be noted that the principle enunciates that
parity of treatment will be afforded to:
I) equivalent creditors in relation to
2) comparable debt.
I would like to analyze these two issues.
A. TYPES OF CREDITORS
When a country runs out of foreign currency and cannot service its
debts, a variety of different creditors are affected. It is possible to draw
up a list of the sorts of creditors who are likely to be affected: (1) banks
and other financial institutions; (2) international financial creditors (such
as the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements and the World
Bank); (3) government creditors-either as direct creditors or alternatively
as guarantors (through relevant export agencies) in relation to credit pro-
vided by others; (4) trade supply creditors; and (5) individual investors.
Which of these creditors should be made subject to the restructuring
process? Which of these creditors should be regarded as equivalent cred-
itors for the application of the principle that equivalent creditors should
have parity of treatment?
The one category of creditors which is always part and parcel of the
restructuring process is the first category addressed above, namely the
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banks and financial institutions. The fundamental concern is that all (or
practically all) banks and financial institutions have to be part of the
restructuring arrangement. Recently the Philippines' restructuring was
delayed for months because one bank was reluctant to agree to the pack-
age. How is this achievement of critical mass organized? There is no
formal forum. There is no equivalent to the Paris Club which operates
for government creditors. What basically happens is that the banks select
a small group of banks ranging from about eight to twenty which acts as
the representative body of the bank creditors for the purposes of dis-
cussing with the country concerned the shape of the restructuring package
applicable to the circumstances of the country. Usually this will be done
in liaison with the IMF. The representatives of the banks are frequently
called a Steering Committee and this committee frequently constitutes
subcommittees like economic subcommittees and documentation subcom-
mittees. The outcome of the deliberations of the steering committee with
the country concerned is submitted to the banking community at large.
Often there are banks which act as national coordinators for banks in
different regions. Then a great deal of discussion and effort goes on to
achieve adherence by the banks to the proposed restructuring arrange-
ments. Even if a bank refuses to sign a restructuring arrangement, it will
usually find itself subject to a de facto restructuring since the banks which
do restructure will effectively make the continuance of their restructuring
dependent upon the de facto restructuring of nonparticipant banks. I will
comment in more detail on the tool for achieving this, namely the man-
datory prepayment clause, later.
Often the restructuring arrangements will involve the raising of invol-
untary new money from the banks. Here parity of treatment between the
banks and the requirement for all banks to participate is most pronounced.
Usually the parity of treatment is achieved by requiring all banks to
participate in a set percentage of their relevant outstandings to the country
on a specific historic date.
It is generally accepted that the providers of soft loans, basically in-
ternationalfinancial creditors like the IMF and World Bank, are exempt
from the restructuring process. There is a recent development which may
strain the application of this understanding. This is the cofinancing pro-
gram of the World Bank. This involves the provision of hard loans to
troubled countries by a syndicate involving the World Bank and com-
mercial banks. These arrangements contain a provision stipulating that
they are exempt from restructuring. So far it has not been tested whether
this will be upheld.
Government creditors are made subject to the restructuring process.
The government-creditor restructuring happens in a formal way insofar
as there is a specific forum in Paris called the Paris Club where the
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government-creditor representatives formulate the appropriate restruc-
turing arrangements with the country concerned. Sometimes, however,
a country will seek to bypass the Paris Club in order to seek to avoid
the formal confirmation of default that application to the Paris Club
implies.
It should be noted that the Paris Club only deals with the restructuring
of debt. It is a rule of the Paris Club that the provision of new credit will
not be discussed as part of any Paris Club arrangement. The most recent
instance where this has been a problem is the case of Poland. Poland has
sought to obtain new credits from the government creditors, and the
inability of the Paris Club to deal with that request led to conditional
signing of the relevant Paris protocol followed by individual negotiations
between the Polish representatives and the different government creditors
concerned. This sort of formality does not apply to the bank restructurings
where the Steering Committee will formulate whatever program is nec-
essary for the country concerned.
Both the Paris Club and the steering committee of the banks will be at
pains to ensure that there is compatibility between the terms of the gov-
ernment-creditor restructuring and the commercial-bank restructuring.
The case of trade creditors is rather interesting because it has received
very different treatment. Usually the trade creditors do not subscribe to
any coordinated formal agreement. Also, the requirements laid down in
the bank restructuring agreement as to how they should be treated have
varied from country to country. In certain exceptional circumstances,
trade debt has been exempted from restructuring. In certain cases trade
credit has been made subject to precisely the same requirements as the
bank restructuring arrangements, i.e., there has been a requirement that
it should only be paid off at the same rate that the restructured debt due
to the banks is paid off. In other cases, a trade credit program has been
initiated under which the country is required to have outstanding trade
credit of certain volumes over certain periods of time. These requirements
can be satisfied either by the lengthening of existing trade credit or the
obtaining of new trade credit.
There is only one example of the trade creditors organizing themselves
along similar lines to the bank creditors and subscribing to an overall
arrangement; usually individual trade creditors make their own individual
arrangements with the country concerned. The exception is the case of
Nigeria where a Steering Committee of the trade creditors was formed
and, in negotiations with the representatives of Nigeria, a detailed struc-
ture concerning the issuance of promissory notes by the Central Bank of
Nigeria was formulated and the restructuring offer was sent to the trade
creditors worldwide with arrangements for acceptance and appropriate
reconciliation of debt.
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The treatment of individual investors has also been the subject of a lot
of discussion and some different treatment. Generally, individuals are
exempted from the restructuring process. The way that individuals would
usually be affected is if they were to hold publicly issued bonds or floating
rate notes. In most of the European and African restructurings, bonds
and floating rate notes are restructured if they are held by banks and other
financial institutions. If they are not held by banks or other financial
institutions, e.g., if they are held by individuals, then they are exempt
from the restructuring requirement. In many of the Central and South
American restructurings, bonds and floating rate notes are exempt from
the restructuring process whether or not they are held by banks. In each
case, individuals holding the bonds or floating rate notes will not be subject
to the restructuring process.
The country which has given rise to the most intense investigation of
the problems relating to bonds and floating rate notes is Costa Rica. In
the original restructuring, the problem became so intense that a special
pari passu study group was set up with representatives of the country and
the banks and an independent chairman to report generally concerning
the problem to the two sides. That group reported that there were two
ways in which bonds and floating rate notes could be restructured. The
first way was the way used in the European and African restructurings
of requiring the banks and other financial institutions to restructure their
debt. The second way was by formulating an exchange offer under which
securities similar to the securities to be restructured are offered to the
holders of the old securities in replacement of those old securities. The
new securities would contain the provisions for the new restructured debt.
Costa Rica has now embarked on the second of these arrangements,
having initially carried out a restructuring exercise entailing the first ele-
ment. Under the exchange-offer route, individuals would be caught up
within the restructuring process.
One final comment is called for on this issue of what creditors are
equivalent. The extent of any restructuring depends upon the amount of
foreign currency available to the country concerned. At one extreme, if
a country has absolutely no foreign currency whatsoever and creditors
will not provide any new money, then worries about precedent and worries
about principle, as to who should be subject to the restructuring process
and who should not, become academic. In that situation, all the debt
would be restructured because there would be nothing available to service
it. So far the problem has not arisen in such an extreme form.
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B. TYPES OF DEBT TO BE SUBJECT
TO THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
Should all the debts due to the creditors who are to be subject to the
restructuring be restructured'? Usually there are exempted from restruc-
turing certain categories of debt.
One preliminary point: what is made subject to restructuring is basically
categories of debt falling due for payment within a specified capture pe-
riod. During the first phase of the restructuring crisis, the capture period
was kept short. Frequently it was one year. The prime distinguishing
feature of the second phase of the restructuring crisis is that the capture
periods have been made considerably longer, and this has involved a great
deal of concern about the conditionality for restructuring usually focusing
on the IMF and appropriate reveiw procedures.
The first category of exempted debt is secured debt. Usually the security
has to exist over tangible movable assets to be excluded. In other words,
security over immovables situated in the country carrying through the
restructuring is not regarded as other than sovereign risk and is not ex-
cluded from the restructuring process.
It is often the case (and I think it is absolutely right) that there should
be exempted from restructuring new credits provided to the country after
the commencement of the capture period for the first restructuring of a
country. The provision of new money to the country is what will lead in
the long run to normalization of credit arrangements, which is in every-
body's interest. The restructuring process should not contain within it
any form of disincentive for the provision of new credit to the country.
A further exempted category is debt subject to guarantees from guar-
antors outside the country concerned if the guarantee has been issued by
someone other than a bank or financial institution. The result of this
exemption is that the relevant debt will be subject to a call under the
guarantee but the subrogated rights of the guarantor will or will not be
subject to restructuring depending upon the category of the creditor
concerned.
Debt incurred under a foreign exchange contract is usually exempt as
is indebtedness arising out of contracts for the purchase or sale of precious
metals.
Indemnity payments for increased costs will be exempted as will top-
up and top-down requirements under multicurrency facilities.
It has also now become generally accepted that interbank deposit debt
should be excluded from restructuring. In some of the earlier restructur-
ings, this sort of debt was made subject to the restructuring requirement.
The Bank of England and other regulators expressed concern about in-
terbank deposits being restructured because of the adverse impact it could
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have on the interbank market. Accordingly, all the modern restructurings
exempt interbank deposits from the restructuring.
Different arrangements treat short-term debt differently. This basically
comprises trade credit from banks in the form of letter of credit outstand-
ings, acceptances and so on. Sometimes this sort of debt is restructured,
and sometimes it is not. Why is there no uniform treatment? Again it
basically depends upon the amount of foreign currency available to the
country concerned. If trade credit is made subject to restructuring, then
it might be possible in some cases to avoid the need to provide new credits
to the country. Alternatively, it may reduce the amount of new money
that needs to be lent into the country at the relevant time. Brazil was the
first case to implement a restructuring of trade credit. It has been made
subject to restructuring in various recent arrangements including the Phil-
ippines and Morocco. The techniques for restructuring trade credits are
quite complicated, and those techniques are still in the process of
development.
III. Provisions of the Bank Restructuring Agreement
Setting out the Requirement for Parity of Treatment
Perhaps the most obvious method of achieving parity of treatment for
differing categories of comparable indebtedness would be to ensure that
the debtor country covenants with the bank creditors not to pay com-
parable indebtedness owed to other creditors without the consent of the
bank creditors. This path, however, has not been pursued in most of the
restructurings. Basically, the reason for this is concern that a provision
of this sort might be construed as inducing breach of contractual
arrangements.
Therefore, there has been developed a technique of what has become
called the mandatory prepayment clause. In essence, the mandatory
prepayment provisions state that if a given proportion of an item of
comparable indebtedness owed to a third-party creditor is paid, then
the same proportion of the rescheduled indebtedness owed to the bank
creditors must also be paid. Put another way, the provision requires
that reduction in exposure of another creditor or class of creditors must
be accompanied by a pro rata reduction in the exposure of the bank
creditors.
In practice, the relevant provision in the rescheduling agreement will
be somewhat more complex than the foregoing remarks suggest. In par-
ticular, the provision is likely to provide that payments to the bank cred-
itors will be required only if they (or a majority of them) request a re-
duction and the reduction in third-party creditor exposure was made without
the consent of the bank creditors (or a majority of them).
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This mandatory prepayment provision effectively entails that equivalent
creditors outside the formal restructuring process are also involved de
facto.
Between the banks that formally subscribe to the restructuring agree-
ment, there is then a very complex and thorough set of provisions reg-
ulating equal treatment in relation to receipts and recoveries if the country
defaults on its payments under the agreement.
IV. Some Consequences of the
Parity of Treatment Clauses
The principle of parity of treatment and the detailed provisions of the
mandatory prepayment clause mean that some of the standard provisions
in credit arrangements have to be considerably rethought insofar as they
are incorporated into restructuring agreements. I would like briefly to
mention the way in which two fundamental clauses of credit arrangements
are subject to reformulation in the context of a restructuring. These are
the cross-default and the negative pledge provisions.
Ordinarily in a voluntary credit situation, a cross-default clause is con-
tained within the documentation. It is in the interests of the creditors to
make that cross-default as wide-ranging as they can insofar as the intention
is to provide an early warning signal of a prima facie credit risk. Default
on other debt by a borrower is a most obvious prima facie credit risk.
The intention is to put the creditors in the same position as any other
creditor is in if the debt of that other creditor is defaulted. It is important
to get to the negotiating table as early as possible. However, restructurings
take place in the situation where early warning signals are a luxury long
since dispensed with. All that will be achieved by incorporation of the
ordinary cross-default provisions into a restructuring agreement is con-
tinuing default in relation to debt that should have been put on an orderly
footing. Therefore, one will find in restructuring arrangements that the
cross-default does not operate in respect of all other types of debt due
from the country concerned. Most usually, it is restricted to debt owed
to the bank creditors party to the restructuring agreement. It is all a matter
of incentives and disincentives. The prime incentive that the banks have
is to seek to get the country to pay them on debt due to them. There is
certainly a disincentive on making any provision which entails that the
country has an interest in paying other sorts of creditors.
There is also a philosophic difference in the way that the negative pledge
works between the ordinary voluntary credit and the restructuring ar-
rangement. In an ordinary voluntary credit, the concern is to tie up the
negative pledge fairly widely to prevent other creditors obtaining any form
of preferential security position. In a restructuring, however, there is an
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advantage to the creditors and to the country if new money is provided
albeit on a privileged, secured basis. Lending on a secured basis will be
one of the first ways in which new creditors will provide new money to
the country. Another way is the emergence of trade lines. Therefore, it
is important to allow a reasonable amount of room in the negative pledge
clause for new debt to be provided to the country on a secured basis.
Sometimes that relaxation lies in allowing trade lines to be secured. Some-
times provisions are inserted to allow project financing to be provided on
the basis that the project is evaluated as self-financing and the financing
concerned is secured over the assets involved in the project.
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